How can cooperation persist if, for one partner, cheating is more profitable than cooperation in each round, while the other partner has no option to cheat? Our laboratory experiments suggest that such a situation exists between the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and its nonpredatory client reef fish species, which actively seek cleaners to have their ectoparasites removed. Clients Ctenochaetus striatus regularly jolted in response to cleaner mouth contact, and these jolts were not linked to the removal of parasites. In addition, cleaners did not search for parasites but fed on mucus when exposed to anaesthetized clients, which could not control the cleaners' behaviour. Field data showed that clients often terminated an interaction immediately after a jolt. Client species with access to only one cleaning station, owing to their small territories or home ranges, terminated interactions mainly by chasing cleaners while clients with access to two or more cleaning stations mainly swam away. Thus, the chasing of cleaners appeared to be a form of punishment, imposing costs on the cleaner at the client's (momentary) expense. Chasing yields future benefits, as jolts were on average less frequent during interactions between cleaners and individuals that had terminated their previous interaction by aggressive chasing.
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The main focus of cooperation theory is on the problem of cooperation between unrelated individuals despite the option of profitable cheating (Dugatkin 1997) . Trivers (1971) proposed that individuals might refrain from cheating their partners because the long-term benefits of cooperation in repeated interactions would eventually outweigh the short-term advantage of cheating, which is achievable only once. This idea was formalized by Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) with the iterated prisoner's dilemma game (IPD). Over the last 15 years, many extensions of the IPD have been developed (reviewed in Dugatkin 1997), all of which deal with a symmetric game in which all players have the same set of strategic options. Therefore, all control mechanisms are based on 'positive reciprocity' (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995) , that is, every player will usually cooperate as long as the partner cooperates and will usually switch to cheating if the partner cheats.
However, the assumption that partners have the same set of strategies available is often violated. We investigated such a potentially asymmetric game, the interactions between the cleaner wrasse, Labroides dimidiatus, and its nonpredatory client reef fish. In this mutualism, the majority of reef fish species actively visit cleaners within their small territories (cleaning stations), to have ectoparasites and diseased or dead tissue removed (reviews : Feder 1966; Losey et al. 1999; Côté 2000) . Trivers (1971) proposed that predatory clients refrain from consuming cleaners because the long-term benefits of repeated parasite removal outweigh the short-term advantage of such cheating. The majority of client species, however, are planctivorous or grazers and therefore have no means to profit from cheating the cleaner. The cleaners' perspective has long been ignored, and it is therefore still unclear whether cleaners profit from cheating, that is, from feeding on client mucus and scales, or whether they are optimizing their food intake by searching for ectoparasites and dead or infected tissue. In the latter case, interactions between cleaners and nonpredatory clients would be a by-product mutualism (Brown 1983) , also called pseudoreciprocity (Connor 1986), making client control of cleaner fish behaviour unnecessary. However, there are indications that cleaners may cheat. Randall (1958) and Losey (1971) reported that cleaners sometimes take bites to which the clients respond with a short body jolt and that clients sometimes react aggressively to such bites. Stomach analyses of cleaners also
